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TRANSMISSION SITING IN DEREGULATED
WHOLESALE POWER MARKETS:
RE-IMAGINING THE ROLE OF COURTS IN
RESOLVING FEDERAL-STATE SITING
IMPASSES
JIM ROSSI†
INTRODUCTION
During most of the twentieth century, state and local regulatory
bodies coordinated the siting of power plants and transmission lines.1
These bodies focused on two important issues: (1) the determination
of “need,” so as to avoid unnecessary economic duplication of costly
infrastructure; and (2) environmental protection, so as to provide local land use and other environmental concerns input on the placement of necessary generation and transmission facilities.2 With the
rise of a deregulated wholesale power market, the issue of need is increasingly determined by the market, not regulators. Environmental
concerns with siting, however, frequently remain contested, especially
locally, but the regulatory apparatus for processing these concerns
faces new challenges in deregulated markets. As this Article suggests,
environmental concerns in transmission line siting will increasingly be
addressed at the federal level, with federal concerns predominating
consideration of the issues. The dormant commerce clause does much
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1. See TH E EN ERG Y FO U N D A TIO N /TH E H EW LETT FO U N D A TIO N ,SITIN G PO W ER PLA N TS:R ECEN T
EX PERIEN CES IN C A LIFO RN IA A N D B EST PRA CTICE IN O TH ER STA TES (2002), at
http://w w w .ef.org/docum ents/Siting_Report.pdf (describing the traditionalpow er plantsiting practices
in California and other states);ED ISO N ELECTRIC IN STITU TE,STA TE-LEV EL ELECTRIC TRA N SM ISSIO N
LIN E SITIN G R EG U LA TIO N S (2001), at http://w w w .eei.org/industry_issues/energy_infrastructure/
transm ission/siting_directory.pdf (noting that siting of transm ission lines has traditionally been
regulated at the state level). See also Linda L. Randell & Bruce L. M cD erm ott, Chonicle of a
Transm ission Line Siting, PU B .U TILS.FO RTN IG H TLY , Jan. 1, 2003, at 1 (referring to the "good old
days" oftransm ission line siting).
2. A shley C.Brow n & D am on D aniels,Vision W ithoutSite; Site W thoutVision,ELEC .J.,O ct.
2003,at23,24 ("The traditionalsiting regim e ...envisioned a tw o-partanalysis:one to ascertain need
and one to judge the environm entaleffects ofavailable options.").
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of the work towards making this a predominantly federal concern, but
eventually the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC’s”)
jurisdiction over such matters must be expanded by statute.
Even if Congress does not expand FERC’s jurisdiction, this Article argues that courts can play a positive role to facilitate the resolution of state-federal siting conflicts. A recent siting dispute involving a
power line in the Long Island Sound illustrates this fundamental shift
in the environmental discourse of siting proceedings, as a well as a
3
need for modifications to federal law regarding transmission siting.
Ultimately, FERC may need authority to preempt state siting laws,
but absent congressional action, courts might empower state and local
siting boards to take into account federal goals in competitive markets in making siting decisions.
I. THE CROSS-SOUND KEYSPAN TRANSMISSION LINE SITING
DISPUTE
A recent example of the conflict between state siting and deregulated wholesale power markets involves the Cross-Sound KeySpan
transmission project. Regulatory officials in the state of Connecticut
have strongly opposed the Cross-Sound Cable, a 23-mile merchant
transmission line that would allow Long Island Power Authority to
import power to Brook Haven, Long Island from New Haven, Connecticut, leading to significant delays in the operation of the project.4
The project sponsor built the line in 2002, following FERC’s approval
5
of retail sales at negotiated transmission rates, as well as permit approvals by the Army Corp of Engineers, the New York Public Service
Commission, the Connecticut Siting Council, and the Connecticut
Department of Environmental Protection.6 The project complied with
all state siting and environmental statutes, except for a provision of its
state-issued permit that required the lines to be buried at a certain
depth.7 Expansion of transmission access to locations such as New
York City would provide important capacity, and may have helped in

3. See infra PartI.
4. See Randall& M cD erm ott,supra note 1.
5. TransEnergie U .S.,Ltd.,91 F.E.R.C.¶ 61,230 (2000).
6. See Regional Energy Reliability And Security: D oe Authority To Energize The Cross Sound
Cable: H earing before the Subcom m .on Energy and Com m erce,H ouse Com m .on Energy and Com m erce, 108th Cong. 55-56 (M ay 19, 2004) [hereinafter H earing] (statem ent of Jeffrey A . D onahue,
Chairm an & CEO ,Cross-Sound Cable Co.).
7. Id.at18 (referring to ConnecicutD EP refusalto m odify perm it).
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absorbing some of the transmission shortages that exacerbated the
8
Summer 2003 blackout.
In burying the transmission line, the project sponsor encountered
some problems. It discovered hard sediments and bedrock protrusions along portions of the route, and immediately notified the Army
Corps and the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protec9
tion. Some Connecticut officials cited environmental concerns in opposing the project, such as impacts on shellfish beds and operations in
the New Haven Harbor.10 The transmission line was built, however,
and according to the project sponsor’s CEO the line was “buried to
the permit depth along 98 percent of the entire span and over 90% of
the route with the Federal Channel to an average of 50.7 feet below
11
mean low water, well below the required level of minus 48 feet.”
Nevertheless, the opposition of Connecticut officials kept the
12
transmission line from becoming operational until 2004. This may be
a well-intended dispute over environmental regulation, but the line
was opposed not only by environmental interests in the state of Connecticut. As often is the case with blocking a new entrant to a state’s
power industry, there is also an anti-competitive angle to opposition
to the Cross-Sound line. Northeast Utilities, a major investor-owned
utility whose customers reside primarily in Connecticut (and which
also services customers in Massachusetts and New Hampshire), owns
an older, competing transmission line (the 1385 cable) that runs parallel to the Cross-Sound Cable.13 Northeast Utilities favored updating
its line over approving the Cross-Sound line, with which it would
compete, and requested FERC to use its authority under Section 210
of the FPA to order New York to assist in replacing the 1385 cables.14
After the Cross-Sound transmission line was built, Connecticut
passed a moratorium on the siting of new or expanded transmission

8. The technical advantage to operating tw o transm ission lines betw een Connecticut and Long
Island,as opposed to one,is thatthis w ould allow electric pow er to travelin a sem i-circular loop – in
and outofLong Island,depending on load.
9. Id.at56.
10. Id.at59.
11. Id.at56.
12. Linda Randell& Bruce M cD erm ott,Cross-Sound Blues: LegalChallenges Continue for the
U ndersea Transm ission Line,PU B .U TILS.FO RTN IG H TLY ,Feb.2004,at20.
13. Bruce W .Radford,Cross-Sound Cable Puts Feds on the Spot,FO RTN IG H TLY 'S SPA RK ,June
2004,at1,3.
14. Id.at10.
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lines across Long Island Sound,15 effectively limiting the project sponsors’ ability to make the project comply with Connecticut’s understanding of the permits. The Cross-Sound Cable was authorized to
operate under an emergency order issued by the U.S. Secretary of
Energy following the August 2003 blackout, but that order was lifted
in early 2004, leaving the Cross-Sound line without permission to go
live.16 So effectively, the Cross-Sound cable was completed in 2002,
but remained dormant as a permanent transmission alternative until
Summer 2004, due to a regulatory impasse between the state of Connecticut, on the one hand, and Cross-Sound’s investors and the state
of New York, on the other. As of Summer 2004, a settlement between
the parties allowed the line to go live.17
As FERC Chairman Pat Wood indicated before Congress in
18
May 2004, Federal regulation seems ill-equipped to resolve the issue.
In the context of the 1385 line dispute, Long Island Power Company
requested that FERC use its authority under the Federal Power Act
to direct KeySpan to recommence commercial operation of the CrossSound line, notwithstanding the objections of state regulators.19 However, although FERC has embraced wholesale deregulation, FERC
lacks the authority to preempt the state environmental siting process
for the transmission line.20 Connecticut’s Attorney General, backed
by environmental interest groups and Northeast Utilities, threatened
litigation if the Cross-Sound line is allowed to go live again, instead
favoring expansion of the existing transmission line, owned by North21
east Utilities.
To the extent that transmission remains entirely within the control of local, rather than national, regulators, states have strong incentives to protect their own incumbent firms or citizens, rather than
15. Conn.G overnor Signs M oratorium on G rid Projects,Keeping Cross Sound in Lim bo,PO W ER
M A RK ETS W EEK ,June 30,2003,at31.
16. U nder Section 202(c) of the FPA ,the U .S.Secretary of Energy can m andate operation of a
transm ission line over objections of state regulators, but only in the context of an em ergency – not
w here itism erely found to be in the public interest.
17. Parties SetD ealto Energize Cross Sound Cable,IN SID E F.E.R.C.,June 28,2004,at1 [hereinafterPartiesSetD eal].
18. H earing,supra note 6 (statem entofPatrick W ood,III,Chairm an,FERC).
19. Radford,supra note 13,at10.
20. See supra notes 1 & 2 (describing state siting process).See also D onald F.Santa & Richard
Sikora, O pen Access and Transition Costs: W ill the Electric Industry Transition Track Natural G as
Industry Restructuring,25 EN ERG Y L.J.113,123 (2004) (noting "state regulators'jurisdiction over a
traditionalelectric utility's retailoperations include:retailrate setting,construction and siting ofgenerating and transm ission facilities").
21. Radford,supra note 13.
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supporting interstate cooperative market norms. Only after threatening to approve expansion of the 1385 cables, was FERC able to force
22
the parties to the bargaining table. FERC could not preempt the
states and mandate operation of the Cross-Sound transmission line,
but the threat of it making a decision elsewhere led stakeholders to
negotiate a settlement that allowed the line to operate.23
The Cross-Sound transmission line is not a unique example of
state or local regulation blocking the expansion of infrastructure that
is critical to interstate power markets. As Ashley Brown reports,
transmission expansion projects spawn massive NIMBY concerns,
24
frequently generating state and local opposition. To make matters
worse, many state legislatures fail to authorize state siting boards to
even take into account interstate concerns and some states even allow
localities to block transmission expansion projects.25
II. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
AS A NECESSARY CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION
Although it is not an express mandate of the text of the U.S.
26
Constitution’s Commerce Clause, the dormant commerce clause
doctrine limits of the power of a state government to impair free
trade. As Oliver Wendell Holmes once remarked:
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost
our power to declare an Act of Congress Void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to
the laws of the several states. For one in my place sees how often a
local policy prevails with those who are not trained to national
views and how often action is taken that embodies what the Com27
merce Clause was meant to end.

Among recent judicial skeptics, such as Justices Scalia and Thomas,
the doctrine is referred to as the “negative” commerce clause, indicat28
ing its lack of textual basis in the Constitution. Notwithstanding the
22. PartiesSetD eal,supra note 17.
23. New York and Connecticut Agree to End Cable D ispute,N .Y .TIM ES,June 25,2004,atB6.
Interestingly,the m ostvocalopponentof the transm ission line,ConnecticutA ttorney G eneralRichard
Blum enthal,w as excluded from the negotiations.They Can Bury the Cable,ButNotthe Controversy,
H A RTFO RD C O U RA N T,July 7,2004,atA 9.
24. Brow n & D aniels,supra note 2.
25. Id.
26. The Com m erce Clause provides that "the Congress shall have pow er . .. to regulate Com m erce ...am ong the severalStates ...." U .S.C O N ST.art.I,§ 8,cl.3.
27. O LIV ER W EN D ELL H O LM ES,C O LLECTED LEG A L PA PERS 295-96 (1920).
28. Skeptics believe thatthe purposes of the dorm antcom m erce clause can readily be served by
other m ore textually explicit constitutional doctrines, such as the Im port-Export Clause of A rticle I,
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lack of textual support for the doctrine in the Constitution, the jurisprudence of the dormant commerce clause has a long-standing basis
in American constitutional jurisprudence. As Justice Cardozo famously remarked in striking down a New York Law that set minimum prices all milk dealers were required to pay New York milk
producers, the Commerce Clause prohibits a state law that burdens
interstate commerce “when the avowed purpose of the [law], as well
as its necessary tendency, is to suppress or mitigate the consequences
of competition between the states.”29 The Court invoked this general
principle to strike a New York regulatory scheme that had been used
30
to deny a license to an out-of-state milk processing facility. Since the
licensing provision had been enacted “solely [for] protection of local
economic interests, such as supply for local consumption and limitation of competition,” the Court found it to be unconstitutional.31
Since the 1980’s, when deregulation began to take hold in a variety of industries, the Supreme Court has had several occasions to address dormant commerce jurisprudence. In one of its cases on the
32
topic, General Motors v. Tracy, the Court evaluated Ohio’s differential tax burdens for in-state and out-of-state natural gas suppliers, but
refused to find a violation of the dormant commerce clause on the
particular facts that had been raised. General Motors, which mounted
a legal challenge to Ohio’s differential tax, was a large enough customer to purchase its gas from the open market (rendered competitive by national regulators) rather than bundled gas from a state regulated local distribution company (“LDC”).33 However, absent
competition between the LDC and the open market serving General
Motors, the Court reasoned, “there can be no local preference,
whether by express discrimination against interstate commerce or undue burden upon it, to which the dormant Commerce Clause may ap-

Section 10 orthe Privileges and Im m unities Clause ofA rticle IV ,Section 2.These alternatives are not
w ithouttheirow n critics.See,e.g.,Brannon P.D enning,W hy the Priveleges and Im m unities Clause of
Article IV Cannot Replace the D orm ant Com m erce Clause D octrine,84 M IN N .L.R EV . 284 (2003);
Brannon P.D enning,Justice Thom as,The Im port-ExportClause,and Cam ps Newfound/O watonna v.
H arrison,70 U .C O L.L.R EV .155 (1999). H ow ever,for purposes of this A rticle,letitsuffice to em phasize that the alternatives w ould m ake protections against interstate regulatory barriers m uch narrow er.
29. Balw din v.G .A .F.Selif,Inc.,294 U .S.511,522 (1935).
30. Id.
31. H .P.H ood & Sons,Inc.v.D u M ond,336 U .S.525,531 (1949).
32. 519 U .S.278 (1997).
33. Id.at281-82.
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ply.”34 The case illustrates how intra-state regulation, which may impede competition (as where, for example, state regulators retain jurisdiction over retail rates), poses a potential tension under the dormant commerce clause, which protects interstate competition where
national regulators have made a policy decision favoring competitive
markets. FERC clearly has made such a decision in the context of the
wholesale power market, making the dormant commerce clause relevant.
Other recent cases extend the dormant commerce clause beyond
merely protecting the external (interstate) market. In C&A Carbone,
Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, the Supreme Court invalidated a municipally-imposed monopoly over non-recyclable solid waste collected for
35
processing and transfer. To guarantee a minimum stream of revenues for the project, the Town of Clarkstown, New York adopted a
flow control ordinance, allowing the private operator of a transfer station to collect a fee of $81 per ton in excess of the disposal cost of
solid waste in the private market.36 C&A Carbone, Inc. processed
solid waste and operated a recycling center, as it was permitted to do
37
under the Clarkstown flow control ordinance. The flow control ordinance required companies like Carbone to bring nonrecylable waste
to the locally-franchised transfer station and to pay a fee, while prohibiting them from shipping the waste themselves.38 “[A] financing
measure,” the flow control ordinance ensured that “the townsponsored facility will be profitable so that the local contractor can
build it and Clarkstown can buy it back at nominal cost in five
years.”39 The Court reasoned that the local law violates the dormant
commerce clause because “in practical effect and design” it bars outof-state sanitary landfill operators from the participating in the local
market for solid waste disposal.40 In so reasoning, the majority drew
from a 1925 case, written by Justice Brandeis, which held unconstitutional a statute prohibiting common carriers from using state highways over certain routes without a certificate of convenience and necessity.41

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.at301.
511 U .S.383 (1994).
Id.at386-87.
Id.at387-88.
Id.at386-87.
Id.at393.
Id.at389,394.
Buck v.K uykendall,267 U .S.307 (1925).Justice Brandeisw rote forthe Court:
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If a municipal government created and owned the facility itself,
this would bring the monopoly within an exemption to the dormant
42
commerce clause–the market-participant exemption. In creating
monopolies, however, local governments frequently work with private firms, using the advantages of the state—subsidies, below-market
interest rates from non-taxable bonds, bypassing state or local restrictions on use of municipal tax powers, etc.—to assist firms and provide
incentives for them to provide service. Since municipal governments
often help to pay for privately-operated infrastructure, such as waste
disposal facilities, through the issuance of bonds, it is understandable
that a local government may want to create a monopoly, in order to
ensure that the facility maintains sufficient revenues to cover its costs
and to avoid jeopardizing the government’s bond rating. Such facilities are allowed to collect charges, which serve the same basic function as a tax. If the government itself were to build, own, and operate
a facility, the political process would impose a general tax, but with
private operations subsidized by a state or locally enforced monopoly,
the tax implications of such projects are obscured. The Town of
Clarkstown, New York, for example, guaranteed revenue for its solid
waste transfer station—it promised a minimum of 120,000 tons of
waste per year, allowing the firm to make more than $9.7 million in
annual revenue–and, after a period of five years, the town agreed to
buy it for $1.43 One way of understanding the Court’s rejection of the
Clarkstown flow control ordinance is based on its concerns with impermissible government-assisted monopolies against the backdrop of
interstate competition.
The basic animating principle of the recent dormant commerce
clause cases has frequently been described as the protection against

[The statute's] prim ary purpose is notregulation w ith a view to safety or to conservation of
the highw ays,butthe prohibition ofcom petition.Itdeterm ines notthe m annerofuse,butthe
persons by w hom the highw ays m ay be used. It prohibits such use to som e persons w hile
perm itting itto others forthe very sam e purpose and in the sam e m anner.
Id.at315-16.
42. Reeves,Inc.v.Stake,447 U .S.429 (1980);H ughes v.A lexandria Scrap Corp.,426 U .S.794
(1976). W hile m any have criticized this exem ption to dorm ant com m erce clause jurisprudence, it is
defended as a pragm atic balance betw een com peting federalism concerns.D an T.Coenen,U ntangling
the M arket-ParticipantException to the D orm antCom m erce Clause,88 M ICH .L.R EV .395 (1989).The
exem ption is lim ited,and is notautom atically available w here the state could expand into the m arket;
To availitself of the exem ption the state m ustestablish thatitis a m arketparticipantand m ay notuse
m ere contractualprivity to im m unize dow nstream regulatory conductin a m arketin w hich itis nota
directparticipant.South-CentralTim berD ev.v.W unnicke,467 U .S.82 (1984).
43. C& A Carbone,511 U .S.at387.
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discrimination between in-state and out-of-state competitors.44 If
these decisions are taken at face value, the Supreme Court’s dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence might be said to embrace a procompetition stance, consistent with the ideology and goals of a neoclassical economic conception of federalism. In Tracy, for example,
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, stated, “[t]he dormant commerce clause protects markets and participants in markets, not tax
payers as such.”45 He bolstered this vision of the dormant commerce
clause by referencing the famous words of Justice Jackson:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer
and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation,
that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign
state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise,
every consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any.
Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of
46
this Court which has given it reality.

This–the neoclassical view of the dormant commerce clause–sees the
role of federal courts as protecting states from interfering with the
47
economic exchange of a free market economy. On this view, its primary purpose is to guard against balkanization by protecting free
trade from state government interference in the external market.
It would be a mistake, however, to read the dormant commerce
clause as a constitutional mandate for competition, let alone deregulation. As dormant commerce clause jurisprudence itself recognizes,
there are exceptions to the dormant commerce clause where the state
48
itself takes on the role of market participant. Further, the dormant
commerce clause allows substantial state government intervention in
the setting of prices, subsidies, and taxes, so long as a state does not
engage in differential treatment in the same market in ways that burden interstate competition.49 Moreover, since the dormant commerce

44. Paul E. M cG real, The Flawed Econom ics of the D orm ant Com m erce Clause, 39 W M . &
M A RY L.R EV .1191,1223 (1998).
45. G eneralM otors Corp v. Tracy,519 U .S.278,300 (1997).
46. H .P.H ood & Sons,Inc.v.D u M ond,336 U .S.525,539 (1949).
47. M cG real, supra note 44; Steven G ey, The Political Econom y of the D orm ant Com m erce
Clause,17 N Y U R EV .O F L.& SO C .C H A N G E 1 (1989-90);Julian N .Eule,Laying the D orm antCom m erce Clause to Rest,91 Y A LE L.J.425 (1982).
48. See supra note 42 (discussing the m arketparticipantexception).
49. Forexam ple,one ofthe leading cases suggesting thatthe dorm antcom m erce clause allow s the
setting of rates is M unn v.Illinois,94 U .S.113 (1876) (upholding legislative approval of joint price
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clause is not derived from the express language of the U.S. Constitution, Congress can override it by adopting a national policy that preempts, or overrides, the competitive market between individual
states. General Motors v. Tracy, for example, seems to carve out a
50
safe harbor for state regulation of natural gas distribution. Under
the Commerce Clause, Congress has the express authority to establish
an agency such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, giving it the
jurisdiction to regulate railroad rates previously left to individual
states. “Our Constitution,” the late Julian Eule wrote, “did not attempt to solve economic parochialism by an express prohibition
against interference with free trade. Instead, it shifted legislative
power over economic matters that affect more than one state to a single national body”.51
To take a more modern example than the now-defunct ICC railroad regulation regime, Congress has created FERC, which has made
a major policy choice to implement regional competitive wholesale
power markets.52 Congress has the power to override FERC’s decision to implement regional competitive wholesale markets, but no
one has seriously proposed this. Alternatively, Congress might expand FERC’s jurisdiction, taking some or all regulatory authority
over retail markets away from state regulators. If it did so, by occupying the lawmaking field, Congress might preclude states from enacting some laws that discriminate against out-of-state suppliers in deregulated wholesale markets. But again, Congress has not done so.
Congress’ inaction, however, does not mean that preemption plays no
role in this context. Congress’ acquiescence in FERC’s competitive
policies serves as one legal source for a type of federal preemption of
individual states acting in ways that impair commerce between the
states. Absent a change in federal policy, state efforts to curtail competition in wholesale electric power markets could be suspect under
the dormant commerce clause, to the extent that they undermine the
interstate markets created by FERC. While a federal preemption argument for interstate market norms is based in a positive legal source
of congressional or federal agency enactments which preclude conagreem entby grain elevators in Chicago againsta dorm antcom m erce clause challenge,given concern
w ith regulating a com m on carrierasa m onopoly in the "public interest").
50. 519 U .S.at825.
51. Eule,supra note 47,at430.
52. O rder No.888,Prom oting W holesale Com petition Through O pen Access Non-discrim inatory
Transm ission Services by Public U tilities and Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public U tilities and
Transm itting U tilities and Recovery ofStranded Costs by Public U tilities,61 FED .R EG .21,540 (M ay
10,1996).
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trary state laws, the dormant commerce clause also arguably finds
some source in the cooperative behavior between two or more states
that have adopted a competitive norm of exchange in which Congress
acquiesces.53
Many have suggested that the neoclassical account of the dormant commerce clause–as a legal source of free trade policies between the states–is flawed.54 An alternative view understands the
dormant commerce clause not as inherently protecting competition
itself, let alone free markets, but as protecting a political process that
makes markets possible. For instance, in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy, the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts tax and rebate scheme for milk, even where the tax operated neutrally without
regard to the milk’s place of origin, but where tax revenues went into
a subsidy fund and were distributed solely to Massachusetts milk producers.55 In writing for the majority, Justice Stevens embraced a political process account of the dormant commerce clause, in which its
role is seen as representative-enforcing in a manner similar to
Carolene Product’s famous footnote 4.56 As Justice Stevens remarked
in striking down the tax and subsidy regime in West Lynn Creamery:
Nondiscriminatory measures, like the evenhanded tax at issue here,
are generally upheld, in spite of any adverse effects on interstate
commerce, in part because ‘the existence of major in-state interests
adversely affected . . . is a powerful safeguard against legislative
abuse.’ However, when a nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a
subsidy to one of the groups hurt by the tax, a state’s political process can no longer be relied upon to prevent legislative abuse, because one of the in-state interests which would otherwise lobby
57
against the tax has been mollified by the subsidy.

Rather than inherently protecting competition and free markets, the
purposes of the dormant commerce clause doctrine can be understood with the framework of Madisonian democracy as well as effi-

53. Jim Chen,A Vision Softly Creeping:CongressionalAcquiesence and the D orm antCom m erce
Clause,88 M IN N .L.R EV .1764 (2003).
54. See supra note 47.
55. 512 U .S.186 (1994).
56. U nited States v.Carolene Products,304 U .S.144,152 n.4 (1938).John H artEly has applied
the representation-reinforcing role ofCarolene Products to equalprotection jurisprudence.JO H N H A RT
ELY ,D EM O CRA CY A N D D ISTRU ST (1980).
57. 512 U .S. at 200 (citing M innesota v. Clover Leaf Cream ery Co., 499 U .S. 456, 473 n.17
(1981)and othercases).
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ciency—specifically, limiting welfare-reducing interest group rent58
seeking in the state regulatory process.
Unlike the traditional public choice critique, which condemns all
state and local rent-seeking, the political process account of the dormant commerce clause targets only those rent-seeking laws that restrain commerce pursuant to implicit or explicit contracts between
other states. The state political process allows states, like the U.S.
Congress, to adopt rent-seeking legislation, in the form of regulation,
subsidies, and taxes. However, an individual state cannot enact a law
that undermines a desirable pro-commerce regime that has been put
into place through the implicit or explicit cooperation of states, any
more than it can undermine a pro-commerce regime adopted formally by Congress or a federal agency (under the preemption clause).
Some rent transfers are permissible, if not desirable, in state and
local political processes. For example, rent-seeking in the form of a
neutral corporate tax exemption for utilities, or rent-seeking in the
setting of utility rates to favor industrial growth, is likely permissible,
and subject only to the safeguards of the local political process. However, rent-seeking in the form of exclusionary regulation that limits
access to the interstate market is more suspect as an approach to
regulating economic matters, especially where market exchange is the
background norm as a matter of national policy. Florida’s Supreme
Court rejected a dormant commerce clause challenge to use of the
state’s restrictive power plant siting statute to restrict the building of
59
new plants by out-of-state suppliers, but the inadequacy of a record
establishing discrimination against out-of-state merchant suppliers
may have impeded the development of this legal argument. At a
minimum, dormant commerce clause jurisprudence requires states
and localities to explain how regulatory actions and legislation restricting power supply in the wholesale market or transmission expansion might serve legitimate purposes, such as environmental or consumer protection.
More challenging is the constitutional status of state or localfranchised monopolies against the backdrop of dormant commerce
clause jurisprudence. On the political process account, the Town of
Clarkstown, New York violated the dormant commerce clause by
granting a monopoly that imposed a veiled tax on users of waste dis-

58. For elaboration of this view ,see M axell L Stearns,A Beautiful M end: A G am e Theoretical
Analysisofthe D orm antCom m erce Clause D octrine,45 W M & M A RY L.R EV .1 (2003).
59. Tam pa Elec.Co.v.G arcia,767 So.2d 428,436 (Fla.2000).
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posal outside of the locally-sponsored facility, including out-of-state
facilities. Its monopoly franchise was invalidated. In Carbone, Justice
Souter wrote a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Blackmun, arguing that the majority had ignored the distinction between private and public enterprise and that the monopoly created by
the flow control ordinance is easily distinguished from the “entrepreneurial favoritism” the Court has previously condemned as protectionist.60 What distinguishes this monopoly from a constitutionally
permissible monopoly, or do local and state electric, natural gas, and
telecommunications monopolies risk the same fate if they do not
open their service territories and network facilities to competitors?
The historical lack of a background norm of competition excuses
many historical monopolies from the constitutional reach of the dormant commerce clause: if there is no interstate market, a state or locally imposed monopoly cannot discriminate against out-of-state
commerce. With the development of interstate markets in telecommunications and electric power, however, more difficult questions
emerge. Will any state or local monopoly raise dormant commerce
clause problems? For example, is it unconstitutional for a utility to
impose a surcharge on all users of distribution service, regardless of
whether they purchase their power from local or out-of-state suppliers?
If a municipality, such as the City of Clarkstown, operates a government-owned monopoly over telecommunications or electric distribution service, the market participant exception to the dormant
commerce clause shields its conduct from the reach of the commerce
clause.61 Franchised private utilities—such as investor-owned utilities—pose a potential problem but are not necessarily unconstitutional, even under the political process account of the dormant commerce clause. The political process account, however, warns state and
local governments to approach the financing of such operations with
care. In the Carbone case, the Town of Clarkstown promised to make
up losses from operating the transfer facility at competitive rates, pre62
sumably by taking these losses out of its general revenues. What the
dormant commerce clause seems to prohibit is a local government

60. C& A Carbone,Inc.v.Tow n of Clarkstow n,511 U .S.383,416 (1994) (Souuter,J.,dissenting).A ccording to the dissent,"The Com m erce Clause w as not passed to save the citizens of Clarkstow n from them selves." Id.at 432.Thus,the dissent rejects extending the political process account
beyond scenariosthatdiscrim inate betw een localand out-of-tow n participants.
61. See supra note 42 (describing the m arketparticipantexception).
62. See supra notes35-43.
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explicitly indemnifying a private monopoly out of the public fisc, even
where these impose the same monopoly and fees on both in-state and
out-of-state providers of service. The Takings Clause does not require
governments to take on such obligations, but the dormant commerce
clause may prohibit them if they are the result of rent-seeking that
imposes burdens on the interstate market. Further, as in Carbone, authorizing above-market fees solely for purposes of maintaining the
monopoly may be constitutionally suspect.63 As we move from local to
state monopoly franchises, concerns with a single firm capturing the
political process are weaker—a single firm that dominates municipal
politics may have little power in state-wide regulatory and political
processes—so state-franchised monopolies may be more likely to pass
constitutional muster; but even neutral financing arrangements may
be suspect if they favor local enterprise and have the “practical effect
and design” of impeding out-of-state competitors.
To return to the Cross-Sound example and other state moratoria
on siting new facilities, to the extent that FERC has deregulated
wholesale power, such disputes raise potential issues of great concern
under the dormant commerce clause. While the state of Connecticut
certainly may impose legitimate environmental restrictions on permits, its moratorium raises serious anticompetitive concerns—
particularly where it is used to keep a project that has already been
built from becoming operational. The dormant commerce clause will
be a likely tool for challenging such restrictions, especially where, as
in Connecticut, competitors stand to benefit from the restriction.
State and local environmental regulation can survive such dormant
commerce clause challenges. However, refusing siting due to statebased claims of need, or where in-state competitors are aligned with
environmental interests, will increasingly raise concerns under the
dormant commerce clause.
III. LOOKING TO CONGRESS AND COURTS TO OVERCOME IMPASSES
While the dormant commerce clause may be a necessary limit on
states’ ability to limit siting, it is not sufficient to ensure competitive
interstate power markets. The dormant commerce clause will invalidate only the most blatantly protectionist state regulations. It certainly does not deal well with the problem of state inaction, or state
stonewalling against interstate power markets due to a lack of state

63. Id.
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legislative authorization to approve new transmission projects.64
Given the combination of prevalent state inaction in expanding
transmission facilities, along with the many legitimate environmental
concerns behind state and local siting laws, the dormant commerce
clause will probably not be sufficient to overcome impasses between
states, or between state and federal regulators. Dormant commerce
clause principles will likely be under enforced in this context.
In this context, federal preemption is one way of bolstering the
interstate market coordination goals of the dormant commerce
clause. Ideally, Congress needs to expand FERC’s authority over
transmission line siting. If Congress does not do so—and Congress
certainly is not the institution on which we should rely—federal
courts have the power to nudge states towards action by empowering
state siting boards to take into account federal goals in interstate
transmission markets, even absent state legislative authorization.
A. Congress’ Obstacles
Proposals to expand FERC’s authority over transmission siting
are not new. For more than a decade, industry experts have recognized that such modifications to the FPA will be necessary for competition to thrive.65 The most recent proposals do not vest FERC with
primary authority over siting, but envision FERC as playing a backup role where individual states fail to reach closure on siting disputes

64. A s A shley Brow n and D am on D aniels observe,"Because very few states include explicitreference to regionalconsiderations in the substantive law governing em inentdom ain orsiting authority,it
is leftto siting officials and review ing courts to factorregionaleffects into the calculation ofw hich projects serve the public interest." Brow n & D aniels,supra note 2,at26.Ifa state legislature fails to delegate such authority to a regulator,there is a potentialproblem ofinaction on the partofboth state legislatures and regulators.
65. Judge Richard Cudahy sees federal regulation of electric pow er transm ission "m ore or less
inherentin the schem e of deregulation and com petition,w hich depends for its functioning upon w idespread access to the transm ission netw ork." Richard D .Cudahy,FullCircle in the Form erly Regulated
Industries?,33 LO Y .U .C H I.L.J.767,768 (2002).Richard Pierce em braces expanded congressional
authorization for the Federal Energy Regulatory Com m ission to resolve transm ission siting disputes,
noting the inevitable incentives states face to erect im pedim ents to interstate com m erce. Richard J.
Pierce,Jr.,Environm entalRegulation,Energy & M arketEntry,15 D U K E EN V TL.L.& PO L'Y FO RU M
167 (2005) (D uke Environm ental Law & Policy sym posium contribution). For m ore than a decade,
Pierce has been arguing for the sam e basic congressionalsolution.Richard J.Pierce,Jr.,The State of
the Transition to Com petitive M arkets in NaturalG as and Electricity,15 EN ERG Y L.J.323 (1994).Jim
Chen advocates increased federal authority over telecom m unications for sim ilar reasons. Jim Chen,
Subsidized RuralTelephony and the Public Interest: A Case Study in Cooperative Federalism and Its
Pitfalls,2 J.TEL.& H IG H TECH .L.307 (2003).
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on their own.66 Regional transmission operators (“RTOs”) will provide an important forum for the resolution of these disputes, with
FERC having the ultimate authority to order expansion where states
fail to do so on their own.67 It is likely that such proposals will continue to be proposed to Congress, although it is questionable whether
they will be adopted into law.
As many have suggested, FERC’s authority to preempt state sit68
ing of transmission lines needs to be modified. Unfortunately, Congress faces some institutional obstacles of its own in implementing reforms. In a recent defense of the “presumption against preemption,”
which would empower states to take the initiative to solve many of
these issues on their own, Roderick Hills summarizes three main failures in the federal government, and particularly Congress, in setting
statutory reform agendas.69 Each of these applies to energy legislation, such as recent proposals to expand FERC’s transmission jurisdiction.
First, Hills observes that collective action problems allow narrowly focused interest groups to control even national regulatory
processes, echoing what Richard Stewart has referred to as “Madi70
son’s Nightmare” —a faction-ridden maze of capture of national majoritarian political processes by interest groups. In the context of energy legislation, it is quite common for Congress to bundle together
multiple unregulated reforms, producing logrolling solutions that may
confront obstacles due to one or two high-profile objectionable provisions. For example, the main energy bill before Congress in 2003 contained provisions that would have more clearly expanded FERC’s authority over transmission in order to enhance reliability.71 This bill

66. Edw ard Com er,FERC and the States:A M arriage ofNecessity,ELEC .J.,N ovem ber 2004,at
85,87 (advocating "nationalenergy legislation that contains a provision for the Com m ission to have
lim ited backstop transm ission siting authority to help site transm ission lines in 'interstate congestion
areas'designated by the D epartm entofEnergy is stateshave been unable to agree orm ove forw ard.").
67. Id. at 86 ("Regional transm ission organizations can play an im portant part in planning and
expanding transm ission system s to m eetthe needs ofregionalelectricity m arkets.").
68. In this sym posium issue,for instance,Professor Pierce em braces expanded congressionalauthorization forFERC to resolve transm ission siting disputes.Pierce,Environm entalRegulation,Energy
& M arketEntry,supra note 65.H ow ever,Congress has consistently failed to actto adoptsuch proposals.
69. Roderick M .H ills,Jr.AgainstPreem ption: H ow Federalism Can Im prove the NationalLawm aking Process, available at http://papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id=412000 (last visited
M ar.5,2005).
70. Richard B.Stew art,M adison'sNightm are,57 U .C H I.L.R EV .335.(1990).
71. PeterBerh & D an M organ,W ithoutEnergy Legislation,G rid,Power Policy in Lim bo,W A SH .
PO ST,N ov.27,2003,atE01.
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failed to pass primarily because of unrelated statutory provisions limiting state tort liability for the fuel oxygenate methyl tertiary-butyl
72
ether (MTBE).
In addition, as Hills suggests, individual representatives are frequently preoccupied with pleasing constituents—by approving earmarks and pork-loaded packages—leading Congress to neglect gen73
eral policymaking. Again, energy legislation provides an example of
the failures of the national political process. The 2003 energy bill contained multiple provisions on different topics aimed at local or regional constituents, such as provisions aimed to provide federal aid
for a Shreveport, Louisiana shopping mall which houses the chain restaurant “Hooters.”74 Senator John McCain dubbed the proposed leg75
islation a bill for “Hooters and polluters.”
Finally, Hills observes, what Samuel Beer has called “political
76
overload” plagues the ability of Congress to set the regulatory
agenda, since only a small number of issues can effectively occupy
Congress’ decision agenda.77 In the energy context, again, Congress is
unlikely to even consider national energy legislation unless a major
national or international crisis brings it to the agenda—the OPEC oil
embargo (leading to passage of Carter’s energy plan in 1978), the
Gulf War (leading to passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992), or
post-September 11 concerns over the relationship between terrorism
and oil (leading to Congress’ failed energy bill in 2003). On occasion,
individual members of Congress propose stand-alone bills designed to
expand FERC’s authority, but these generally have little support in
Congress and frequently disappear without a hearing.78
Even if Congress fails to expand FERC’s authority—as much of
the political science Roderick Hills cites to would predict—the CrossSound line dispute illustrates that FERC may increasingly play a role

72. CarlH ulse,Even W ith Bush's SupportW ide-Ranging Legislation M ay H ave Been Sunk W ith
Excess,N .Y .TIM ES,N ov.26,2003,atA 17.
73. Bruce Cain,John Ferejohn,& M orris Fiorina,TH E PERSO N A L V O TE:C O N STITU EN CY SERV ICE
A N D E LECTO RA L IN D EPEN D EN CE (1987).
74. D an M organ,The G O P Congress,H igh on the H og,W A SH .PO ST,Jan.18,2004,atB01.
75. Id.
76. Sam uelH .Beer,PoliticalO verload and Federalism ,10 PO LITY 5 (1977).
77. JO H N W .K IN G D O N ,A G EN D A S,A LTERN A TIV ES,A N D PU BLIC PO LICIES 16-18 (1995).
78. In 2004,Senator H illary Clinton proposed a stand-alone reliability bill,presum ably because
she had concluded thatthe largerenergy billw as doom ed.See Senator Clinton to Push Reliability Bill,
U rges Lawm akers to Pass ItApartfrom the Energy Bill,ELEC .U TIL.W EEK ,Jan.20,2004 at3.H ow ever,w ith an election yearin 2004,m any considered a m ore stream lined billunlikely to pass Congress
unless itw as very m odest.
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in related regulatory proceedings over which it has jurisdiction and
can play a positive role in the process. The Cross-Sound dispute illustrates how FERC has some limited powers to do things on its own,
absent Congressional authorization through new statutes. For example, in the Cross-Sound dispute, FERC threatened to make a decision
in a related proceeding that would involve updating an older transmission line, and this threat of regulatory action brought the state
regulators to the negotiation table.79 FERC’s cognate authority over
related projects is a powerful tool to bring parties to the bargaining
table. Although not every environmental concern was placated by the
resulting settlement, Long Island Power Authority (“LIPA”), CrossSound and Connecticut Light & Power Company (“CL&P”) each
agreed to contribute $2 million to a fund, to be administered jointly
by New York and Connecticut, which would be dedicated to the study
and preservation of Long Island Sound.80 In some instances, FERC
may be able to use its clear regulatory authority—over mergers,
transmission tariffs, and RTOs—to bring parties to the table when
impasses occur, even if it is unable to preempt state siting processes.
Yet, it is well recognized that FERC cannot solve these disputes on its
own.81
As counterintuitive as it might sound, absent action by Congress
and FERC, the presumption should be in favor of state siting boards
acting to solve the problems with interstate transmission. If nothing
else, a presumption in favor of state jurisdiction might work to set the
national lawmaking agenda, but more important, it might place clear
incentives with state regulators, making action more likely in contexts
where state and federal regulators seem to have reached an impasse.
B. How Federal Courts Can Overcome Recalcitrant State Legislatures
Many state siting statutes were adopted with old regulatory structures—a nationally-uniform cost-of-service structure—in mind. In
many states, siting statutes do not authorize state or local regulators
to act to open up their network access facilities to out-of-state com82
petitors. In this sense, one barrier to interstate power markets is
state legislatures, which lack the institutional incentive to modify old
regulatory statutes. To the extent the problem is state legislature re79. See supra note 65 (describing the prospectoffederalintervention).
80. PartiesSetD eal,supra note 17.
81. See,e.g.,Pierce,Environm entalRegulation,Energy & M arketEntry,supra note 65;Com er,
supra note 66.
82. See Brow n & D aniels,supra note 2.
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calcitrance (whether tacit or explicit), federal courts might attempt to
draw on preemption principles to overcome the impasses by introducing greater competition in the state political process, reducing the
power of any one branch or level of state or local government to be
recalcitrant through inaction.
As an illustration, consider the issue of a state legislature’s failure to authorize regulatory action by state or local agencies under
state siting statutes. State siting bodies may not be able to act to site
facilities, or even to consider the interstate implications of siting, absent authorization by a state legislature. In the context of deregulated
wholesale power markets individual states frequently face strong incentives to protect firms in their own internal market, such as local
utilities. Several states have adopted moratoria on exempt wholesale
generators, or have limited regulators’ authority to site such plants to
83
in-state utilities only. Florida’s Supreme Court, for example, has interpreted a state power plant siting statute to limit plant siting to
those suppliers who are Florida utilities or who have contracts with
Florida utilities.84 Effectively, merchant power plants are precluded
from siting in Florida for purposes of entering the interstate market.
Perhaps taking a cue from Florida’s success in blocking the development of new wholesale power plants that do not directly serve in-state
customers, other state and local governments, particularly in the
Southeastern United States, have imposed moratoria on merchant
plants.85 Pursuant to the siting statute passed by the Florida Legislature, Duke Energy’s application was rejected by the state Supreme
Court, even though the state agency initially had accepted the application under a belief that it had the legal jurisdiction to do so.86

83. Concerned w ith their states becom ing transm ission superhighw ays or pow er plant siting
grounds for others,m any states have considered or adopted such m oratoria.See,e.g.,Conn.G overnor
Signs M oratorium on G rid Projects,Keeping Cross Sound in Lim bo,PO W ER M A RK ETS W EEK ,June 30,
2003,at31 (describing Connecticut's m oratorium on new transm ission lines);Florida County Im poses
Power PlantM oratorium ,ELEC .D A ILY ,July 2,2001,at1 (describing Brow ard County,Florida,m oratorium thatstalled a 511 M W m erchantpow er plantthathad been approved by city officials in D eerfield Beach,Florida);Indiana Com m unities Press for Power PlantM oratorium ,IN D IA N A PO LIS STA R ,
M arch 1,2000 (indicating governor's supportforpow erplantm oratorium ).
84. Tam pa Elec.Co.v.G arcia,767 So.2d 428,435 (Fla.2000) (holding thatstate's pow er plant
siting statute "w as notintended to authorize the determ ination ofneed for a proposed pow erplantoutput that is not fully com m itted to use by Florida custom ers w ho purchase electrical pow er at retail
rates,").
85. D eisinger,2000;Nervous ofNO x,Southern G ovs.PutPlants on H old,ELEC .D A ILY ,A ug.28,
2001;State Lim itson M erchantPlants a G rowing W orry,G EN ERA TIO N W EEK LY ,A ug.22,2001.
86. Tam pa Elec.Co.v.G arcia,767 So.2d 428,435 (Fla.2000).
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However, even where a state legislature is recalcitrant and fails
to authorize local or state-wide regulatory agencies to take into account federal goals (such as concerns with reliability in deregulated
wholesale power markets) while siting transmission lines or power
plants, courts could presumptively authorize such officials to act to
pursue federal goals. Roderick Hills has argued for a presumption
against preemption87—and the political science reasons he gives for it
have particular resonance in the context of electric power—but in
many instances (as in Florida), state officials and local political bodies
lack the authority to act. As Hills has argued elsewhere, state regulatory initiative on issues might be facilitated by “dissecting the state” if
state and local agencies are presumptively authorized to implement
federal goals, even where state enabling legislation is ambiguous as to
state agency jurisdiction.88 When a federal program gives grant money
directly to a state governor or local governments, it plays the executive branch or local governments off against the state. Similarly, when
Congress has passed a statute such as the Federal Power Act and a
federal agency has clearly articulated general goals in implementing
this statute (as FERC has articulated the goal of deregulated interstate wholesale power markets), 89 even if Congress has not delegated
specific implementation authority to the agency, it might be implied
that it has given remedial implementation authority to state agencies,
overriding state constitutional doctrines such as separation of powers.
Presumptive preemption of structural constraints in state constitutions serves the function of allowing states to work towards correcting
congressional failures that may remain in statutes.
Instead of deferring to state court interpretations of limited authority for siting boards, an alternative approach to reviewing the
agency’s jurisdiction would ignore the ambiguous jurisdictional limits
in the state statute, presumptively authorizing the state officials to
consider the application—and to site the facility—if this were related
to the pursuit of clear (albeit general) federal goals in reliable deregulated wholesale power markets. This presumption would be overcome
only if the state legislature is explicit in its recalcitrance, adopting a
statute that precludes consideration of the issue by state regulators.
By simultaneously embracing a presumption against federal preemption in interpretation of statutes and regulations and a presump87. See H ills,supra note 69.
88. Roderick M .H ills,Jr.D issecting the State: The U se ofFederalLaw to Free State and Local
O fficialsFrom State Legislatures'Control,97 M ICH .L.R EV .1201 (1999).
89. See supra note 52 (referencing O rderN o.888).
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tion in favor of state or local regulatory action (i.e., authorizing state
and local officials to act, notwithstanding a tacitly recalcitrant legislature), public law could align incentives to favor national reform of
statutes or regulations in the context of economic regulation. In contrast to the current approach, a presumption against preemption
would leave responsibility clearly in the hands of state actors. State
and local officials would presumptively be authorized to act to pursue
federal goals, although if a state legislature wishes to override the authority of a state agency to implement a federal program, it would
possess the authority to do so expressly. So understood, a judiciallyimposed set of default rules could promote coordinated federalism,
even where Congress has not acted. Judicially-led coordinated federalism would replace court-mediated competition between the federal
government and the states, which often leads to regulatory impasse,
with cooperation. Simultaneously, federal courts may stimulate some
regulatory action to address interstate network problems in states
where none currently exits by introducing competition within the
branches of state government. There are two primary objections to
such a set of default rules: first, that federal courts lack the power to
implement them and that they are internally inconsistent; and second,
that this approach glorifies states’ rights or idealizes states as innovators.
To address the second objection first, this is not a states’ rights
view of economic regulation. Indeed, there is no such thing, given that
Congress has broad power to override states on most, if not all, issues
of economic regulation. Even this, though, does not make states black
boxes in discussion of the allocation of jurisdictional authority. States
have an important role to play. The point is not, however, that states
are inherently superior over the national government as innovator.
Nor is it to promote decentralization as an end state of affairs. Instead, states would act as facilitators and agenda-setters in national
lawmaking, helping national solutions to adapt to regulatory problems where the national lawmaking process fails to do so on its own.
Judicially-led coordinated federalism is a second-best solution to congressional reforms of national regulatory statutes that fail to give federal agency regulators the necessary jurisdiction, but it also may
prove necessary to overcome existing obstacles to regulatory reform
in network industries.
The first objection—that federal courts lack the power to apply
these default rules and they are internally inconsistent—also does not
withstand scrutiny. These proposals are not premised on any constitu-
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tional power that that the conventional set of default rules in public
law do not also rely on. The power to vest state and local officials
with authority to implement federal goals, like conventionallyaccepted judicial power to create implied preemption, can be derived
90
from the Commerce Clause. Where Congress or federal regulators,
within their constitutional authority, have stated a general goal,
courts presumably would look to state or local regulators to implement it.91 This is not coercive, as state political actors still would have
to make the choice to regulate. If the state political process, such as
by legislative action, explicitly overrides this choice, state action is
more likely to exist for purposes of mounting a dormant commerce
clause challenge if the state approach imposes spillover costs on interstate commerce.92 This approach downplays the significance of “independent” state constitutions, but many states already recognize in
their constitutional jurisprudence that state constitutions are not to be
interpreted in isolation where a state is implementing a federal program.93 As a matter of constitutional law, federal courts have as much
power to implement such a set of default rules as they do to read implied preemption of state law into federal statutes and regulations.94
In fact, to the extent that the presumptive authorization of state executive or local agency regulation to implement federal goals is based
on political process considerations, rather than a substantive legal
mandate that altogether precludes state regulation, it should be less
controversial than implied preemption of substantive law, under
which a federal court forces a state to make a substantive policy
choice that is consistent with federal law even where Congress has not
clearly spoken. Rather than reading judicial power broadly by expansive jurisdictional readings of federal statutes and regulations–as tra-

90. The Com m erce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate activities such as electric pow ertransm ission.FederalCourts interpretthe scope ofdelegations to federalagencies.Thus,underfederalpreem ption doctrine,federalcourts have the authority to override state legislatures w here nationalinterests
authorized by Congress w arrantit.
91. M uch as H ills envisions courts presum ptively authorizing state and local officials to pursue
nationalgoals.H ills,supra note 88.
92. See supra PartII(discussing dorm antcom m erce clause).
93. See, e.g., Ex Parte Elliott, 973 S.W .2d 737 (Tex. A pp. 1998); M cFaddin v. Jackson, 738
S.W .2d 176 (Tenn.1987); D ep't of Legal A ffairs v.Rogers,329 So.2d 257 (Fla.1976).Thus,even
w here federalcourts do notexercise such authority,state courts m ightauthorize such action as the best
interpretation ofstate constitutionalseparation ofpow ers doctrine.A s Ihave argued elsew here,im plicit
authorization forstate executive and localagencies to acton behalfoffederalgoals is the bestinterpretation ofstate separation ofpow ers— a m atterofstate constitutionallaw .Jim Rossi,D ualConstitutions
and ConstitutionalD uels,__ W M .& M A RY L.R EV .__ (forthcom ing 2005).
94. See supra note 90.
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ditional jurisdictional federalism would envision–the default rules for
preemption envision a more modest role for the courts, as they align
political incentives to favor cooperative federalism approaches even
where Congress has not explicitly done so. While a presumption
against preemption of substantive statutes and regulations may seem
at odds with a presumption that preempts state constitution allocations of powers, these default rules are no less inconsistent than the
conventional public law approach, which favors preemption of substantive law but disfavors preemption of state constitutions.
Such an approach gives state and local governments a more positive role to play in deregulated markets than judicial federalism currently envisions under public law. It creates a political process that is
more likely to clarify jurisdictional responsibility, while also lowering
the costs of using state government to implement federal goals. In the
long run, it might also promote a more stable national solution on
important issues than the conventional approach of relying on courts
to draw the lines between incomplete federal regulation and the
states.
For example, in the context of electricity transmission siting, if
state and local regulatory commissions are granted presumptive authority to consider national goals in reliable wholesale power markets, states would clearly share responsibility with Congress for
transmission expansion. At least some state regulator in each state
would clearly possess the regulatory power to expand transmission to
accommodate deregulated markets. States might also be implicitly authorized to build pricing for such transmission expansion into their
own regulatory structures for retail rates. This will not solve every
problem with regulation of electric power transmission, for which a
national solution is necessary. Some states may choose to expand
transmission, allowing deregulated markets to work, while others may
not, creating chokehold regions that could force consideration of a
more national solution to state-based transmission regulation. At the
same time, responsibility for the lag clearly would sit with the states
or Congress. If states are presumptively authorized to take such goals
into account, presumably a state’s failure to act to site transmission in
response to requests for transmission expansion could be brought
within the realm of the dormant commerce clause, ultimately facilitating the emergence of more cooperative solutions between states
where national regulators fail to take action. At a minimum, recalcitrant state legislatures would be required to explicitly reject state participation in national markets. Designing default rules for judicial re-
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view with these bargaining problems in mind will not bring an end to
all jurisdictional conflicts and impasses. Such design can, however,
make explicit previously hidden institutional preferences within states
for recalcitrance with national competition policies, better facilitating
disruption of the jurisdictional impasses that plague the current approach to federal preemption.
IV. CONCLUSION
FERC’s wholesale competition policies increasingly make dormant commerce clause principles relevant. This will have important
implications for state siting processes, in which many environmental
concerns with power plants and transmission lines are raised. But
there is reason to think that the dormant commerce clause will not be
strong enough as a legal norm to overcome siting impasses. Ultimately, Congress needs to act to expand FERC’s authority over
transmission siting. As FERC Chairman Pat Wood stated before
Congress in 2004:
The view of one State should not be the sole determinant of
whether a region’s electrical customers receive the economic and
reliability benefits of facilities that have already been built. In these
narrow circumstances, the protection of interstate commerce may
warrant a greater federal role.
This suggestion is related to, but separate from, the issue in the
pending energy bill of having a federal backstop for siting of signifi95
cant new interstate power transmission projects . . . .

FERC itself has recognized the need for expanded jurisdiction. Once
Congress approves it—and that may take some time—the expansion
of FERC’s authority over transmission siting may require modification of state environmental regulation in the context of power plant
transmission statutes. Environmental regulation will not necessarily
be rendered redundant, although some modification of state laws will
be necessary. States may retain the authority to consider local land
use concerns, as well as pure environmental protection concerns under state siting statutes. Protectionist barriers to siting, even those
that are politically aligned with environmental protection, will increasingly bump up against the dormant commerce clause. Further,
with modification to the FPA, FERC will increasingly play some role
in overriding states where impasses result. One solution may be for
states to play a more coordinated role in raising environmental concerns in the context of an RTO.
95. H earing,supra note 6 (statem entofPatrick W ood,III,Chairm an,FERC).
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As Chairman Woods has recognized, FERC has some role under
existing law to arbitrate siting disputes where states are at an impasse,
even where Congress fails to act. Even if Congress does not act to expand FERC’s jurisdiction over transmission siting, FERC has some
important tools at its disposal which can help to bring states and
stakeholders to the bargaining table. The Cross-Sound dispute illustrates the positive role that FERC may be able to play in this process.
However, FERC may not be able to solve impasses on its own. If
Congress does not expand FERC’s jurisdiction and role, it is entirely
appropriate for federal courts to step up to the plate in resolving siting impasses by looking to the dormant commerce clause and to federal preemption principles to override recalcitrant state legislatures.

